Anything that can go wrong will go wrong.
— Murphy’s Law. Widely attributed to Captain Edward A. Murphy Jr., an aerospace engineer working on rocket sled experiments at Edwards Air Force Base, California, around 1949.
Murphy’s Law — And Why It Matters Underwater
Most people have heard of Murphy’s Law. It’s that universal truth you mutter when your toast lands butter-side down, or when you pick the slowest queue at the supermarket. If something can go wrong, sooner or later it will go wrong.
On dry land, Murphy’s Law is usually just an annoyance. Underwater, it can kill you. A rebreather is a life-support system operating in an environment where you cannot breathe on your own. If a seal fails, a valve sticks, or a sensor reads incorrectly, you may have only seconds to recognise the problem and respond. There’s no pulling over to the hard shoulder. There’s no switching it off and trying again.
That’s why engineers don’t just accept Murphy’s Law — they plan for it. They have a formal, structured way of sitting down before anything gets built and asking: what could go wrong here, how bad would it be, and what can we do about it? That process has a name, and it’s the subject of this page.
What Is FMECA?
FMECA stands for Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis. It’s a structured method for thinking through everything that could go wrong with a design — component by component, failure by failure — and then doing something about it before anyone’s life depends on it working.
The concept dates back to the late 1940s, when the United States military developed it to improve the reliability of weapons systems and aerospace equipment.1 If you’ve ever heard of NASA’s obsessive approach to safety — checklists, redundancy, triple-verifying everything — FMECA is the framework that sits underneath a lot of that thinking. It has since been adopted across virtually every engineering discipline, from automotive to medical devices to nuclear power.
Today, FMECA is formalised in international standard IEC 60812:2018,2 which defines the procedures for both FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) and the more detailed FMECA variant that adds criticality ranking. For rebreather manufacturers seeking European type-approval, FMECA is referenced as a requirement under EN 14143,3 the European standard for self-contained re-breathing diving apparatus.
But you don’t need to be a certified manufacturer to use it. FMECA is just as valuable — arguably more valuable — for someone building a one-off unit in their workshop. Because when there’s no quality assurance department looking over your shoulder, you are the quality assurance department.
The Three Questions
At its heart, FMECA is beautifully simple. For every component in your rebreather, you ask three questions:
- What can go wrong? (the failure mode)
- What happens if it does? (the effect)
- How bad is it, and what do we do about it? (the criticality and mitigation)
That’s it. The power of FMECA isn’t in its complexity — it’s in forcing you to systematically consider every possible failure, rather than just the obvious ones. It’s the failures you don’t think of that tend to cause the most trouble.
Think of it like a thought experiment. You pick up a component — say, a check valve in your breathing loop — and you imagine all the ways it could misbehave. It could stick open. It could stick closed. It could crack. It could be installed backwards. The O-ring could degrade. For each of these, you then ask: what would the diver experience? And finally: how likely is this, how serious is it, and what can I do to prevent it or detect it early?
FMECA isn’t a one-off exercise you do at the start and then forget about. Good practice is to revisit it whenever you change a component, modify a design, or discover a new failure mode — even if that discovery comes from someone else’s experience.
Why It Matters for Rebreather Builders
You might be thinking: this sounds like something for big companies with engineering teams, not for someone building a unit in the garage. Actually, the opposite is true. Commercial rebreather manufacturers have entire teams doing this work. When you build your own, the thinking still needs to happen — it’s just that all of it rests on your shoulders.
The Deep Life project — an open-source rebreather programme — produced a 104-page mechanical FMECA document covering every component from cylinder valves to breathing hoses, O-ring seals to flapper valves.4 That document analysed over 40 individual components, each with its own design decision review, risk assessment, and failure mode analysis. The level of detail is remarkable — they tested flapper valves with configurations ranging from three to eight supporting fingers, discovering that anything fewer than six could allow the valve to ripple and leak under rapid pressure changes. They found that a standard BCD dump valve could partially seal due to sideways piston movement, leading to a complete redesign. They discovered that certain EPDM O-ring compounds contained a toxic softener called Thiram, prompting them to commission a specially formulated batch.
You don’t need to produce a 104-page document. But you do need to apply the same thinking. Even a simple, one-page FMECA table for each major component will dramatically improve the safety and reliability of your build. It forces you to confront the uncomfortable questions before you’re 30 metres underwater.
Skipping FMECA doesn’t mean the failure modes don’t exist — it just means you haven’t thought about them yet. The sea doesn’t care whether you’ve done your homework.
How To Do a FMECA — Step by Step
FMECA might sound formal, but the process is straightforward. Here’s how to approach it for a rebreather build:
- 1List your components
Break your rebreather down into its individual parts: scrubber canister, canister seals, breathing hoses, check valves, mouthpiece/DSV, counterlung bladders, counterlung dump valves, cylinder valves, regulators, O-rings, fittings — everything. If it’s in the breathing loop or gas supply path, it goes on the list.
- 2Identify failure modes
For each component, brainstorm every way it could fail. Don’t censor yourself — include even unlikely scenarios. A breathing hose could be punctured, kinked, disconnected, blocked, or installed backwards. An O-ring could be missing, the wrong size, degraded, contaminated with incompatible grease, or cut during assembly. Think about manufacturing defects, wear, user error, and environmental factors.
- 3Determine the effects
For each failure mode, describe what would happen. Be specific: “water enters the breathing loop,” “CO₂ is not removed from exhaled gas,” “the diver cannot exhale,” or “PO₂ drops below safe levels.” Think about both the immediate local effect and the knock-on effect on the whole system and the diver.
- 4Rate the severity
How bad is this if it happens? Use a simple three-level scale:
- Low Inconvenient but not dangerous. The dive can continue safely.
- Medium Dive must be aborted, but the diver can reach safety using standard procedures.
- High Potential for serious injury or death if not immediately recognised and addressed.
- 5Rate the likelihood
How probable is this failure? Again, keep it simple:
- Unlikely Rare — requires multiple things to go wrong simultaneously.
- Possible Could happen with normal use, wear, or a single human error.
- Likely Will probably happen at some point unless specifically prevented.
- 6Assess detectability
Can the diver detect this failure before or during a dive? A gross leak that fails a pre-dive pressure test is highly detectable. A slow O-ring degradation or a partially-stuck check valve might not be obvious until it’s too late.
- 7Define mitigations
What can you do to prevent this failure, reduce its severity, or improve its detectability? This might be a design choice (use dual O-rings), a material choice (use EPDM instead of nitrile), a pre-dive check (positive and negative pressure test), a maintenance schedule (replace O-rings annually), or a redundancy (carry bailout gas).
You don’t need to do this entirely from your own imagination. Look at what commercial manufacturers have found, read incident reports, and talk to experienced rebreather divers. Many failure modes have already been discovered the hard way by someone else.
The Risk Matrix
Once you’ve rated the severity and likelihood of each failure mode, you can plot them on a risk matrix. This is a simple grid that helps you visualise which failures need the most urgent attention. The idea comes from IEC 60812, which describes the criticality matrix method for prioritising failure modes.2
| SEVERITY → LIKELIHOOD ↓ | Low | Medium | High |
|---|---|---|---|
| UNLIKELY | Low Risk | Moderate Risk | Significant Risk |
| POSSIBLE | Moderate Risk | Significant Risk | Critical Risk |
| LIKELY | Significant Risk | Critical Risk | Critical Risk |
Anything that lands in the red zone (Critical Risk) must be addressed before you dive the unit. Orange (Significant Risk) items should be mitigated or accepted with clear awareness. Even green (Low Risk) items are worth recording — because conditions change, and a low-risk failure in warm water might become a significant risk in cold water.
If you can’t mitigate a critical-risk failure mode to at least “significant” or lower, don’t build that component that way. Go back to the drawing board. There’s always another design option.
Worked Example: Breathing Loop Check Valves
Let’s put this into practice. Check valves (also called one-way valves or flapper valves) are the components inside your mouthpiece or breathing loop that ensure gas flows in the correct direction — out through the scrubber on your exhale, and back to you on your inhale. They’re small, simple, and absolutely critical. Here’s what a FMECA looks like for this single component:
Component: Check valve (flapper)
Ensures one-way gas flow through the breathing loop — out through the scrubber on exhale, back to the diver on inhale.
| Failure Mode | Effect on System | Severity | Likelihood | Detectability | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valve stuck open (fails to seal) | Gas bypasses scrubber on one side of the loop; CO₂ rises in inspired gas; risk of hypercapnia | HIGH | Possible | Difficult to detect during dive; may hear loss of “click” sound. Detectable in pre-dive check | Pre-dive positive/negative pressure test; listen for audible click during breathing; use silicone valves that self-restore |
| Valve stuck closed | Diver cannot inhale or exhale through affected side of loop; immediate breathing difficulty | HIGH | Unlikely | Immediately obvious — diver cannot breathe | Bail out to open circuit; ensure BOV or accessible bailout valve; pre-dive breathing check |
| Valve installed backwards | Flow direction reversed; exhaled CO₂ returns to diver without passing through scrubber | HIGH | Possible | Not obvious during dive; diver may not notice until symptomatic | Use asymmetric valve seats that physically prevent reverse installation; colour-code inhale/exhale sides; pre-dive flow check |
| Valve cracked or torn | Partial bypass; reduced scrubber efficiency; elevated CO₂ | MEDIUM | Unlikely | May show during pre-dive pressure test; difficult to detect visually without disassembly | Annual replacement of valve discs; visual inspection during maintenance; use tear-resistant silicone |
| Contamination (vomit, debris) | Valve unable to seal properly; partial CO₂ bypass | MEDIUM | Possible | Diver may notice change in breathing feel; unusual taste or smell | Valve seat design with fingers that allow debris to pass through; bail out if vomiting underwater; thorough cleaning after every dive |
| Valve omitted during assembly | No directional flow control; CO₂ bypass; risk of hypercapnia | HIGH | Unlikely | Detectable in pre-dive pressure test and by absence of audible click | Use a pre-dive checklist; include valve check in assembly procedure; design seat so absence is visible |
Notice how even a tiny, inexpensive component like a flapper valve produces six distinct failure modes, several of which are rated as HIGH severity. This is exactly why FMECA is so powerful — it forces you to think about things you might otherwise dismiss as “too simple to go wrong.” The Deep Life project found through testing that flapper valves with fewer than six supporting fingers could ripple under rapid pressure changes, allowing gas to bypass the seal.4 That’s the kind of insight you only get from systematic analysis.
The Deep Life team also discovered that it was possible to cause a check valve to release accidentally under pressure differential — what appeared to require two distinct actions (press a button, then pull) was effectively reduced to one action because pressure differences in the loop during ascent provided the pull force automatically. This led to a complete redesign adding a second locking button.4
The FMECA Template
You don’t need fancy software to do a FMECA — a spreadsheet works perfectly well. Below is the template structure we recommend for rebreather builds. You can copy this table into your own spreadsheet, or download the ready-made template.
| Ref | Component | Function | Failure Mode | Local Effect | System Effect | Severity L / M / H | Likelihood U / P / L | Detectability How & when | Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FM-001 | e.g. Scrubber canister O-ring | Seals canister to housing | O-ring degraded / missing | Seal failure at canister join | Water ingress or CO₂ bypass | H | P | Pre-dive pressure test | Annual replacement; visual inspection; use EPDM | Mitigated |
| FM-002 | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … | … |
Column guide
A ready-to-use spreadsheet with the table structure above, severity scales, a risk matrix worksheet, and example entries to get you started. (.xlsx format)
Start your FMECA early in the design process, not after you’ve built everything. It’s much easier to change a design on paper than to redo a machined part. Revisit and update it as your build progresses — a living FMECA is far more valuable than a one-off exercise.
The goal of FMECA isn’t to eliminate all risk — that’s impossible. The goal is to understand your risks, reduce them where you can, and make sure you have a plan for the ones that remain. That’s what separates a thoughtful builder from a lucky one.
References
- United States Department of Defense (1949). MIL-P-1629 — Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense.Originally developed for military reliability analysis; later superseded by MIL-STD-1629A (1980). The foundational document for all modern FMEA/FMECA methodology.
- International Electrotechnical Commission (2018). IEC 60812:2018 — Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA and FMECA). 3rd edn. Geneva: IEC. Published by BSI as BS EN IEC 60812:2018.The current international standard defining FMEA/FMECA procedures, risk priority numbers, and criticality matrix methods.
- European Committee for Standardization (2013). EN 14143:2013 — Respiratory Equipment — Self-Contained Re-Breathing Diving Apparatus. Brussels: CEN.The European standard for rebreather design and testing, which references FMECA as part of the type-approval process.
- Deas, A., Davidov, B., Evtukov, M. et al. (2014). Deep Life Open Revolution Family of Rebreathers — Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis Volume 4: Mechanical Failure Mode Analysis. Document FMECA_OR_V4_140831, Revision B11, 21 August 2014. Deep Life Group.A comprehensive 104-page FMECA covering all mechanical components of the Open Revolution rebreather family, verified against EN 14143, EN 61508, and NORSOK U-101.
- Wikipedia contributors (2025). ‘Murphy’s law’, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Available at: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murphy’s_law (Accessed: February 2025).Background on the origin and cultural history of Murphy’s Law.